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Abstract
There have lately been a variety of attempts to connect, or even ex-
plain, if not in fact, reduce human consciousness to quantum mechan-
ical processes. Such attempts tend to draw a sharp and fundamental
distinction between the role of consciousness in classical mechanics,
and on the other hand, in quantum mechanics, with an insistence on
the assumed exceptional character of the latter. What is strangely
missed, however, is the role of human consciousness as such in the
very discovery or creation of both of these physical theories. And this
a priori role is far more important than all the possible a posteriori
interplays between consciousness and the mentioned two theories of
physics, interplays which may happen during one or another specific
experiment, measurement, and so on. In this regard it is suggested
that the specific features human consciousness may exhibit during in-
teractions with quantum mechanical systems may as well have other
explanations which do not appear to be less plausible, or less well
founded.
1. Introduction
Since the literature on the relationship between consciousness and
quantum processes is rather considerable, here for the sake of brevity,
we shall refer specifically to one rather typical sample presented by
the recent paper of Stapp.
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For a start, let us for a moment take one or more steps back, and
from the respective perspective, note a few features which may be
relevant not only to the way one deals with the relationship between
consciousness and quantum processes, but possibly as well to the ven-
ture of quantum mechanics itself.
A deficiency, which tends to amount to a rather regrettable feature of
studies in quantum mechanics, is manifested in the fact that, subse-
quent to the times of John von Neumann ended in the 1950s, the main
players prove, intentionally or not, to have a manifest disregard not
only for the latest conquests of pure mathematics, but also of applied
mathematics. What pure mathematics is concerned, this means a near
unanimous limitation to concepts introduced and developed prior to
World War II, such as Hilbert spaces, C*-algebras, and the like, and
of course, to the near exclusive use of the much earlier known scalars
given by the usual real or complex numbers. On the other hand, when
it comes to applied mathematics, one cannot but note with regret that
by now classical, well established and massively used concepts are not
employed according to their full relevance and power. For instance, we
can mention in this regard linear and finite dimensional control theory,
with concepts such as ”state-space”, ”observability”, ”controlability”,
”reachability”, ”stability”, and so on, celebrated ever since the 1960s
with their successes, among others, in the Kalman-Bucy filters.
It may appear to be a first natural reaction on the part of those in-
volved in the cutting edge pursuit of quantum mechanics to disregard
much of everything else in science. After all, it has always been a
widely accepted assumption that, according to our best present knowl-
edge and understanding, the quantum level is underlying all else in
nature. Not to mention that quantum phenomena are so much differ-
ent from whatever else we have known earlier.
However, two objections may nevertheless arise.
First, to the extent that in the study of quantum processes one goes
outside of them and deals, for instance, with consciousness, mind,
brain, or for that matter, with any other relevantly related macro-
scopic phenomenon, one may do well to be familiar with and make
use of the state-of-the-art concepts in these non-quantum realms.
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Second, scientific thinking can only benefit from what in more simple
terms can be called cross-fertilization of concepts across a number of
different ventures in science, often so different as at first not to appear
being related in any relevant manner.
Another feature, ever since the 1920s, of the approaches of most of
those involved in the cutting edge pursuit of quantum mechanics has
been the relentless insistence on, and rather enthusiastic highlight-
ening of what appeared as being the extraordinary and completely
unprecedented difference between that theory, and on the other hand,
all other earlier known theories of physics.
Such and other possibly questionable features in quantum mechani-
cal studies have quite likely had their less than fortunate consequences.
Here in this paper we shall mean by quantum mechanics the theory
of non-relativistic quantum systems of finitely many particles.
2. Are States of Quantum Systems of Any Relevance ?
In control theory, or more at large, in general systems theory, any
given system S that is not supposed to be fixed in time is assigned a
so called ”state-space” XS which contains the set of all its different
possible relevant manifestations.
In von Neumann’s first model of quantum mechanics, Rosinger [1,
pp. 9-13], such a ”state-space” is given by the vectors ψ of a suit-
able Hilbert space H, vectors which are called ”wave functions”, and
which are supposed to be normalized, that is, satisfy the condition
|| ψ || = 1. Further, in this model there is also the concept of ”ob-
servable”, and it is given by self-adjoint operators A : H −→ H. Here
however one should note a certain difference, when compared with
the sense control theory uses the similarly named concept. Indeed, in
quantum mechanics by ”observable” one rather means a specific kind
of ”observation” or measurement of the quantum system, while in con-
trol theory, the term ”observable” describes an important property of
the system as a whole, and not of any of its particular observation or
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measurement. One can recall in this regard the celebrated theorem of
Kalman, according to which a finite dimensional linear system which
is observable will also be stable, if and only if it is controllable.
Similarly, the concept of ”state-space”, and that of ”observable”, in its
quantum specific sense, are present in von Neumann’s second model,
Rosinger [1, pp. 9-13].
On the other hand, in spite of such a presence of the concept of ”state-
space”, one finds as a pillar of the Copenhagen Interpretation state-
ments such as :
”The conception of objective reality of the elementary par-
ticles has thus evaporated not into the cloud of some ob-
scure new reality concept but into the transparent clarity of
a mathematics that represents no longer the behaviour of
the particles but rather our knowledge of this behaviour”,
Heisenberg.
In other words, the ”state-space” is no longer supposed to incorpo-
rate anything at all related to the set of all different possible relevant
manifestations of the quantum system which is under consideration.
Instead, all that the ”state-space” does - and is alleged to be able to
do - is to incorporate but the different possible relevant manifestations
of our knowledge of that quantum system.
Such a view obviously is a most remarkable - and in science, unprece-
dented - total renunciation of any possible ontological relation on our
part to quantum systems, and implies the total resignation to a mere
epistemological connection.
Nevertheless, the Copenhagen Interpretation does not deny that quan-
tum system exists as such as physical entities, and that they may go
through a variety of different physically relevant manifestations, and
do so either all on their own, or in conjunction with their observation
or measurement.
Those who may find such a total renunciation + total resignation hard
to accept, among them Einstein, Schro¨dinger, or Bohm, may simply
ask :
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Are physicists, and for that matter, the theories of physics,
ever to deal with the ”state-spaces” of quantum systems
in the physical sense of this concept, that is, as it is un-
derstood in all the other branches of physics, namely, on-
tologically ?
And if not, then who else is supposed to do it ?
And what kind of other possible scientific theories may be
able to do so ?
The Copenhagen Interpretation, instead of having a constructive ap-
proach to such questions, seems to take a special pride in the men-
tioned total renunciation + total resignation, and appears to do so
under the pretext of, and in direct proportion to the truly unprece-
dented novelty in the whole of modern science of such a controversial
position.
Naturally, scientists evermore and most eagerly aim at bringing forth
truly unprecedented novelties. The Copenhagen Interpretation is ob-
viously not a stranger to such an attitude. What is strange and un-
precedented in science, however, about that interpretation is the ea-
gerness to pay such a considerable price renunciation and resignation
for trying to make sense out of the remarkable novelties of quantum
phenomena.
3. What Aspect of Conscious Involvement Is More
Important ?
As far as we all know, humankind got to know about classical and
quantum mechanics not as a gift from somewhere outside of itself, but
as the discovery or creation of some of its own members. And needless
to say, the respective processes of creation or discovery were acts of
human consciousness.
By the way, lest we may overlook it, it is useful to recall that classical
mechanics is by no means a closed or exhausted subject. Indeed, is-
sues such as for instance turbulence in fluid flow, or even the existence
of regular enough solutions of the Navier-Stokes equations, are still
widely open and highly nontrivial problems.
5
In view of that one may consider that the involvement of human con-
sciousness in classical or quantum mechanics not only starts with the
discovery or creation of the respective physical theories, and keeps
going on with their further development, but that such an ”a priori”
involvement is a far more deep and relevant manifestation of human
consciousness within the realms of physics, than any other ”a poste-
riori” conscious involvement during one or another specific physical
experiment.
In a manifest contradistinction to the above, a great accent is often
placed in the literature dealing with the relationship between con-
sciousness and quantum processes on the significant difference the
consciousness of the human observer plays in classical, as opposed
to quantum mechanics.
It is for instance stated that in classical mechanics ”... all physi-
cally described properties become completely determined by physi-
cally described properties alone, with consciousness a causally inert,
or causally superfluous bystander. Correlations between the physi-
cally and psychologically described properties can be described within
a classical physics based framework, but the psychologically described
aspects will remain essentially epiphenomenal byproducts of brain ac-
tivity”, Stapp.
When encountering such or similar views, and especially coming from
partial or total supporters of the Copenhagen Interpretation, the fol-
lowing comment is hard to avoid :
The fact that classical mechanics, as correctly described in the above
citation, is ”causally complete” only shows that at the ”a priori” stage
of involvement in it of human consciousness - namely, of those who
created or discovered it - a rather perfect job was accomplished. Con-
sequently, in the ”a posteriori” stages of involvement of consciousness,
such as happens in the process of various experiments, human con-
sciousness can have it so much easier, in particular, as a mere witness.
On the other hand, when it comes to quantum mechanics, if one starts
with the mentioned total renunciation + total resignation promulgated
by the Copenhagen Interpretation, and among others, replaces the
6
ontological ”state-space” with a mere epistemological one, one clearly
risks various forms ”incompleteness” in the respective theory. After
all, even the Copenhagen Interpretation does not go so far as to deny
the physical existence of quantum system as ontological entities which
go through a variety of different physically relevant manifestations.
But then, by denying the very possibility of ever reaching in any the-
ory that physical ontology, the risk is taken for ”incompleteness”.
In this way, one may note that the attempts within the Copenhagen
Interpretation which try to connect human consciousness with the dy-
namics of quantum systems are to a good extent trying to support
themselves through a self-fabricated entrapment within the epistemic.
Namely
• one first denies the very possibility of an ontological theory,
• then one ends up with incompleteness, and finally
• one has a chance to introduce some active, causal role for hu-
man consciousness during certain experimental processes, in an
attempt to explain the whole range of dynamics of quantum
systems.
4. About Relative Clumsiness
When one observes, for instance, the Moon from the Earth and does
so with the naked eye, it is very hard to assume that one can cause
by that any relevant disturbance in the motion of the Moon. In other
words, such an experiment performed relating to the dynamics of the
Moon can quite safely be considered as perfectly non-invasive in terms
of that dynamics.
On the other hand, as it is well known, when we implement various
experiments in genetic engineering, many of our actions end up being
not only invasive, but simply destructive, even if they were not meant
to be so.
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The difference between the above two situations, both of them rather
within the realms of classical mechanics, can be seen as a simple mani-
festation of ”relative clumsiness” on our part, having much to do with
the significant differences in the relative sizes we humans have, when
compared with the respective objects of our interest.
Compared with the typical scales in the quantum realms, the relative
difference between them and those of our human scales are far larger
than when we compare ourselves with the realms of genes.
Consequently, it does not appear too far fetched to consider the possi-
bility that various so far disregarded invasive effects may accompany
many of the measurement and observation processes which, as usual,
bring together in interaction macroscopic devices with quantum sys-
tems. And one of the consequences of such invasiveness may possibly
be what goes under the name of the ”collapse of the wave function”,
which puts an instant end to the free dynamics of a quantum system as
described by the Schro¨dinger equation, and switches it to some other
state.
5. Is the Quantum World so Boringly Repetitive ?
One of the arguments brought by the Copenhagen Interpretation in
support of the impossibility of an ontological quantum theory is what
appears to be the inherent randomness of a variety of quantum phe-
nomena, such as for instance, the radioactive decay.
As we know from a large variety of situations, randomness experienced
on a certain level when dealing with a given physical process may not
necessarily be the sign of an inherent essential aspect of the respective
process. Indeed, sometime, like in the case of statistical mechanics,
it may be the effect of an insufficient knowledge on our part of the
precise initial state of the process. Or it may be a deeper ignorance,
namely, of important aspects of the laws of dynamics of that physical
process.
In the case of quantum systems, in addition to some consideration of
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the possible effects of the above mentioned ”clumsiness”, one should
not disregard the eventuality that, because of the same reasons of im-
mense discrepancies of the scales involved, we may miss on certain
relevant features of quantum entities, thus exposing ourselves to what
appear as random manifestations when seen on our level.
It is indeed most surprising to note the following rather dramatic dis-
crepancy.
On our human scales, and higher up, till the cosmic ones, it is very
hard, if not in fact impossible, to encounter among all the immensity
of the number of objects we can observe two perfectly identical ones.
On the other hand, on the atomic and on the quantum scales we make
the assumption that, say, every two electrons are absolutely the same
from whatever point of view relevant to physics.
Well, existence on the quantum or atomic scales must therefore be
just about ... infinitely boring ...
Or perhaps, not ...
In which case the various entities of the quantum realms may actually
have features relevant physically, yet so far not known to us, and thus
not taken into account.
Therefore, one possible way to see the randomness in a variety of quan-
tum phenomena is as an effect of the combination of the ”operative
clumsiness”, mentioned in section 4, with the ”conceptual clumsiness”
pointed to above, a clumsiness manifested in our present view of see-
ing existence on the quantum scales so endlessly boring due to the
immense number of entities which are assumed to be perfectly identi-
cal from whatever physically relevant point of view ...
Indeed, once the ”conceptual clumsiness” of that ”boringly repetitive”
structure of the quantum realms is set aside, it is conceivable that, say
for instance, electrons or photons do in fact spread across a consid-
erable spectrum with respect to a number of yet not known physical
features. And then, the randomness we may observe with respect to
them may be the result of the statistical distribution of such features,
features which in ways not yet known make electrons, photons, and so
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on, behave somewhat differently during our operatively and concep-
tually clumsy present kind of experiments.
6. Let Us Have Some Mixture ...
In Stapp, several recent proposals relating to a quantum theory of con-
sciousness are mentioned. One of them is due to Hameroff & Penrose,
in which three of the presently fascinating ideas are mixed together
in a somewhat ad-hoc manner, in the hope of producing an effect in
which the resulting whole may be larger than the sum of its parts.
The respective parts are the celebrated Go¨del incompleteness result
of the early 1930s, the recent discovery of the microtubular structure
of the neurons, and some ideas from the ongoing and still far from
conclusive research related to quantum gravity.
A problem with such mixes of ideas is that, so often, they do not really
fit together in order to form a more organic whole. What Hameroff &
Penrose use in the hope of constituting a more genuine whole are some
suggested estimates of typical time scales of the action of gravitation
within the brain which, being of the order of tenth of a second, seem
to correlate with those associated with conscious processes.
The validity and relevance of such estimates is, however, an open
question, given that the possible actions of gravity on brain, mind,
neurological processes, or thinking, let alone the respective more pre-
cise ways of manifestation, are still highly hypothetical.
7. The Alleged Dualism of Descartes
It is fashionable to label Descartes a ”dualist”, or even ”substance
dualist”, Stapp. What is missed is a more thorough understanding of
the world-views of thinkers in Europe of those times. To mention a
few of them, Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Pascal, Descartes, Newton,
Leibniz, or Spinoza were deeply religious men in the Judaeo-Christian
tradition. Consequently, none of them - and this includes Descartes
as well - could possibly be anything else but fervent ”monists”.
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As for ”dualism”, or for that matter, ”substance dualism”, chemistry
is practicing it without any objections from any quarter, and it does so
in a most successful manner, when it divides itself into its ”inorganic”
and ”organic” branches.
Biology proceeds in a yet more dramatic manner, when it makes an es-
sential differentiation between ”living organisms” and all other forms
of matter. And such a differentiation is by no means arbitrary or
superficial. For instance, only plants are able to turn through their
metabolism inorganic, thus clearly non-living matter, into living one.
And by far most of the plants only use inorganic matter in their
metabolic processes. Animals, on the other hand, must use in their
metabolism mostly plants or other animals, since they cannot live only
on inorganic intake.
As for Descartes, his division in ”res cogitans” and ”res extensa” was
in his own view but of course about the two branches of a unique tree,
two branches which grow out from the same one and only, universal
and all encompassing, eternal grace of God’s act of creation. In this
way, what is labelled as mere ”dualism” is in the case of Descartes
but about the two surface aspects of manifestation of the fundamen-
tal ”monism” underlying, creating, and for evermore sustaining them.
In this regard, unless seen in ways similar with Descartes and his fa-
mous fellow thinkers of those older times, the so called ”mind-body”
or ”brain-mind” problems are but problems of relating together two
branches cut off a living tree, and with the tree lost, forgotten, or
denied to exist, or even to have ever existed ...
But as at the beginning of section 1, let us stop again for a moment,
and take one or more steps back, in order to gain some perspective.
Indeed, we can use that typically human ability of consciousness which
allows it to be self-referential.
And then we can ask the question :
When one thinks about solving a duality, like for instance,
that of the ”brain-mind” problem, is it not that such a
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thinking happens under the aim of non-dualism, happens
under the sign of an intended monism ?
Therefore, either that unique tree from which the two terms of dual-
ity branched out has ever existed or not, we, by trying to solve the
problem of that duality do in fact plant a tree, a unique tree in our
own thinking, hoping that the two terms of duality may somehow be
grafted into it in an organic manner ...
This is, indeed, what we in fact do - consciously or not - when trying
to go beyond any duality ...
Here however, there seems to be quite some discrepancy between what
the ”... right hand and the left hand ...” end up doing.
For instance, Stapp lists as the first main objection to dualism its fail-
ure to provide some understanding about the ways the two dual, and
so essentially different, terms do interact. The second main objection,
Stapp, is that, in the case of the ”mind-body” problem, for instance,
the physical description already gives a causally and deterministically
complete account of what is going on. Thus the mental element of
the duality is only left as a sort of ”ghost in the machine”, with the
physical side being perfectly able to get along all on its own.
The suggested solution, Stapp, of ”quantum interactive dualism” is
claimed to evade neatly both of these major objections. Namely, the
interaction between the mental and physical is claimed to be given
by the celebrated von Neumann account of the measurement process.
The second main objection above is done away with due to the ma-
jor and essential difference between classical, and on the other hand,
quantum physical processes. Indeed, the latter ones - according to the
Copenhagen Interpretation - are not causally complete, when taken
all alone and only within themselves. And then it is precisely the
mental processes which are alleged to come and complete the causal
structure, and on top of that, they also underlie the structural rela-
tionship between the elements in our streams of conscious experiences.
What is missed in such and other similar arguments is that, before
everything else, it is the unique, consistent, and persistent ”tree” of
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the thinking of the respective physicist concerned with such a duality
which does hopefully bring together in an organic manner the two es-
sentially different ”branches”. And the ”seed” of that ”tree” is there
- and must be there - already in the physicist’s thinking before one
or another claimed method, such as for instance von Neumann’s mea-
surement theory, is brought in to overcome duality.
Unfortunately however, to the extent that we may not be sufficiently
aware of the typically human ability of self-referentiality of conscious-
ness, we easily tend to miss on that ”tree” in us ... And we may also
miss, Rosinger [2], on a far more fundamental ”tree” ...
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